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SECURE AND EFFICIENT KEY MANAGEMENT IN AD-HOC NETWORKS

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To my mother, my late father, my wife, and my children.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	iv
LIST OF FIGURES.....	v
LIST OF SYMBOLS.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
ABSTRACT.....	xi
1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. General Problem Statement	3
1.2. The Goal of the Thesis	3
1.3. System Model	4
1.4. Research Method	5
1.5. Thesis Organization	7
2. Background	8
2.1. Mathematical Backgrounds	8
2.1.1. Elliptic Curve Groups	8
2.1.2. CRT and MRC	14
2.2. Cryptographic Backgrounds	15
2.2.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography.....	15
2.2.2. Key Management.....	20
3. Related Work	22
3.1. Introduction.....	22
3.2. Classification of Ad-hoc Group Key Management Approaches	24
3.2.1. Centralized Group Key Management Protocols	24
3.2.2. Distributed Key Management.....	25
3.3. Partially Distributed Certification Authority	26
3.3.1. Signing Certificate	27
3.3.2. Renewing Certificate	27
3.3.3. Certificate Retrieval.....	28
3.3.4. Share Refreshing.....	28
3.3.5. Analysis.....	29
3.4. Fully Distributed Certification Authority	31
3.4.1. Certificate Renewal.....	31
3.4.2. Certificate Revocation	32
3.4.3. Analysis.....	32
3.5. Self Issued Certificates	33
3.5.1. Small World Phenomenon	34
3.5.2. Shortcut Hunter Algorithm	35
3.5.3. Analysis.....	37
3.6. Group Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol.....	38

3.6.1.	Analysis.....	39
3.7.	Cliques Protocol Suite.....	40
3.7.1.	IKA	41
3.7.2.	Join/Merge	41
3.7.3.	Leave/Partition	42
3.7.4.	Analysis.....	43
3.8.	Skinny Tree (STR) Protocol	44
3.8.1.	Setup	45
3.8.2.	Join/Merge	46
3.8.3.	Leave/Partition	47
3.8.4.	Analysis.....	48
3.9.	Tree Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) Protocol	50
3.9.1.	Setup	52
3.9.2.	Join/Merge	52
3.9.3.	Leave/Partition	53
3.9.4.	Analysis.....	55
4.	Key Exchange Algorithms Based on ECC and MRC.....	57
4.1.	Introduction.....	57
4.2.	Setup Phase	57
4.3.	The key Agreement Protocol (KAP).....	59
4.4.	The Key Transport Protocol (KTP)	62
4.4.1.	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.....	63
4.4.2.	The Mixed Radix Conversion.....	63
4.4.3.	The Mixed Radix Key Transport Protocol.....	64
4.5.	Node Authentication Protocol.....	66
4.6.	The proposed Key Exchange Algorithm.....	68
4.7.	Conclusion	70
5.	Key Establishment Based on Local Broadcast and Transitive Authentication	71
5.1.	Introduction.....	71
5.2.	The Network Leader Election Protocol (NLEP).....	74
5.3.	The Network Leader Confirmation Protocol (NLCP)	76
5.4.	The Network Key Establishment Protocol (NKEP)	78
5.5.	The Groups Key Establishment Protocol (GKEP).....	79
5.6.	Network Membership Operations.....	87
5.6.1.	Join.....	88
5.6.2.	Leave.....	93
5.6.3.	Termination.....	102
5.7.	Conclusion	109
6.	Ad-hoc On-Demand Authentication Chain Protocol	110
6.1.	Introduction.....	110
6.2.	Ad-hoc On-Demand Authentication Chain Protocol (AOAC).....	111
6.2.1.	Authentication Chain Discovery Protocol	113
6.2.2.	Transitive Authentication Protocol.....	123
6.3.	Classification of the AOAC Protocol	136

7. Discussion and Analysis	140
7.1. Introduction.....	140
7.2. Formal analysis using the GNY Logic.....	140
7.2.1. Statements	141
7.2.2. Logical Postulates	141
7.3. Security Analysis	145
7.3.1. Security Analysis of ECDB protocol.....	146
7.3.2. Security Analysis of MRKA protocol.....	153
7.3.3. Security Analysis of TAP protocol.....	157
7.4. Performance Analysis	170
7.4.1. Simulation	171
7.4.2. Complexity Analysis.....	183
7.4.3. Complexity Comparison	189
 8. Conclusion and Future Work.....	 193
8.1. Concluding Remarks.....	193
8.2. Future Research	195
 REFERENCES.....	 197

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Cliques IKA Analysis	43
Table 3.2: Cliques Join Analysis	44
Table 3.3: Cliques Merge Analysis.....	44
Table 3.4: Cliques Leave Analysis	44
Table 3.5: Cliques Partition Analysis	44
Table 3.6: : STR Setup Analysis.....	49
Table 3.7: STR Join Analysis	49
Table 3.8: STR Merge Analysis.....	49
Table 3.9: STR Leave Analysis	50
Table 3.10: STR Partition Analysis	50
Table 3.11: TGDH Setup Analysis	56
Table 3.12: TGDH Join Analysis.....	56
Table 3.13: TGDH Merge Analysis.....	56
Table 3.14: TGDH Leave Analysis	56
Table 3.15: TGDH Partition Analysis	56
Table 7.1: Used GNY statements.....	142
Table 7.2: Simulation parameters	172
Table 7.3: Simulation result for $N = 100$	173
Table 7.4: Simulation result for $N = 200$	173
Table 7.5: Simulation result for $N = 300$	173
Table 7.6: Simulation result for $N = 400$	174
Table 7.7: Simulation result for $N = 500$	174
Table 7.8: Simulation result for $N = 600$	174
Table 7.9: Simulation result for $N = 700$	175
Table 7.10: Simulation result for $N = 800$	175
Table 7.11: Simulation result for $N = 900$	175
Table 7.12: Simulation result for $N = 1000$	176
Table 7.13: The average of our simulation results for all N	176
Table 7.14: Comparison Table of The Key Management Protocols	191

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Research focus.....	5
Figure 1.2: Node A and B are within the transmission range of each other.....	6
Figure 1.3: Node A and B are out of the transmission range of each other	6
Figure 1.4: Research Method.....	7
Figure 2.1: Elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - 4x + 0.67$	9
Figure 2.2: Adding two distinct points P and Q with $-P \neq Q$ on elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 + 7x$	10
Figure 2.3: Adding two distinct points P and Q with $-P = Q$ on elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 + 6x + 6$	11
Figure 2.4: Doubling the point P with $y_p \neq 0$ on elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 - 3x + 5$	12
Figure 2.5: Procedures of Embedding Random Point on Elliptic Curve E	18
Figure 2.6: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [15].....	20
Figure 2.7: Simplified classification of key Management Techniques.....	21
Figure 3.1: Group Key Management Requirements	23
Figure 3.2: Membership Operations in Ad-hoc Networks.....	24
Figure 3.3: System architecture with 3 server nodes, 3 clients and 1 combiner.....	27
Figure 3.4: Share refreshing of a $(n, t+1)$ sharing [22]	29
Figure 3.5: Example of a certificate chain	33
Figure 3.6: Building certificate chains using only locally stored certificates.....	34
Figure 3.7: Example of the small-world phenomenon.....	34
Figure 3.8: Example of a shortcut in a small-world.....	35
Figure 3.9: Small-world graph modeling certificates and users	36
Figure 3.10: Initial problem of certificate propagation.....	38
Figure 3.11: STR key tree [33]	45
Figure 3.12: An example of STR join [33]	46
Figure 3.13: An example of STR leave [33].....	48
Figure 3.14: Tree notations for the TGDH protocol [36]	50
Figure 3.15: Join Protocol [36]	52
Figure 3.16: Tree update in a join operation [36]	53
Figure 3.17: Tree update in a leave operation [36].....	54
Figure 3.18: Leave Protocol [36]	54

Figure 4.1: Each node send BS a list of its immediate neighbors.....	59
Figure 4.2: The network is partitioned into M groups with BS as their leader.....	59
Figure 4.3: Group G_j 's members establish the ECBD key agreement protocol.....	61
Figure 4.4: Group G_j 's members establish the MRKT protocol	62
Figure 4.5: Node Authentication Protocol.....	68
Figure 5.1: Our Proposed Key Establishment Protocol Layers	72
Figure 5.2: Node N_1 locally broadcasts a list of its immediate neighbors	74
Figure 5.3: Node N_0 receives five $INMs$ and constructs its adjacency matrix J_{N_0} that represents g_{N_0}	75
Figure 5.4: Node N_0 calculate its maximum clique $q_{\max}^{N_0}$ using J_{N_0}	75
Figure 5.5: Node N_0 broadcasts a RNM	76
Figure 5.6: WG members broadcast a RCM to all nodes	77
Figure 5.7: WG members send a KEP to the network leader.....	77
Figure 5.8: The Network Key Establishment Protocol.....	79
Figure 5.9: N_0 performs key establishment with the two groups it leads, then locally broadcast (TTL=1) $(K^R \parallel KT_{N_0})$ to each group encrypted by the corresponding group key.....	80
Figure 5.10: L generate both the shared and termination keys of N_j on demand using N_j 's public key	82
Figure 5.11: N_0 immediate neighbors perform group key establishment then distribute the network key.....	85
Figure 5.12: The Set of Data that Each Node Should Store	86
Figure 5.13: A Case Study of Node Joining Process; node N_{13} join the network.....	93
Figure 5.14: Example of non-leader node leave, node N_{12} leave the network.....	95
Figure 5.15: Example of leader node leave, node N_4 leave the network	100
Figure 5.16: Example of leader node termination, node N_4 is terminated.....	107
Figure 6.1: The source sends a $MREQ$ message to the destination which reply with a $MREP$ message	112
Figure 6.2: L_4 and L_1 are leader nodes and belong to the same group (group 1)	113
Figure 6.3: The destination node L_8 neither belongs to group 4 nor group 1	113
Figure 6.4: The source and destination nodes belong to groups that L_1 leads and belongs to.....	115

Figure 6.5: The destination nodes does not belong to groups that L1 leads and belongs to	117
Figure 6.6: Node L1 receives a forwarded <i>CREQ</i> message from a member of a group it leads (group 1)	118
Figure 6.7: Node L4 receive a forwarded <i>CREQ</i> message from its group leader L1	119
Figure 6.8: <i>CREQ</i> path.....	122
Figure 6.9: <i>CREP</i> path	122
Figure 6.10: Nodes <i>A</i> wants to get node <i>B</i> 's certificate	124
Figure 6.11: N_i and h_1 belong to the same group	127
Figure 6.12: N_i belongs to a group leaded by h_1	128
Figure 6.13: N_j and h_n belong to the same group	130
Figure 6.14: N_j belongs to a group leaded by h_n	130
Figure 6.15: A case study that illustrates TAP	133
Figure 6.16: Classification based on node role.....	137
Figure 6.17: Classification based on type of credentials	138
Figure 6.18: Classification based on establishment of credentials	139
Figure 7.1: Relationship between N and the average number of leader nodes.....	177
Figure 7.2: Relationship between N and the average number of nodes leaded by each leader.....	178
Figure 7.3: Relationship between N and the ratio of the number of leader nodes to N	178
Figure 7.4: Relationship between N and the ratio of the number of nodes leaded by each leader to N	179
Figure 7.5: The average number of nodes leaded by each leader form on side and N and the average number of leader nodes form the other side.	179

LIST OF SYMBOLS

N_i	The unique ID of node i
$G_i^{N_x}$	The unique ID of group i led by node N_x
$ G_i^{N_x} $	Group Size of group i led by node N_x
$K_{G_i}^{N_x}$	Group key of group i led by node N_x
R	Network leader
K^R	Network global key
KU_R	Network leader's public key
KM_{N_i}	Node N_i 's master key
KU_{N_i}	Node N_i 's public key based on elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
KR_{N_i}	Node N_i 's private key based on elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
KT_{N_i}	Node N_i 's termination key. This key is used by node $N_j \in G_k^{N_i}$ when its leader N_i is terminated to find the leader of the group that N_i belongs to
K_{L,N_i}	This is a peer-to-peer shared key between node N_i and its group leader L . This key is used to authenticate node N_i to L .
WG	The witness group, a group of nodes that witness that R is the network leader
T_{N_i}	Total number of nodes leaded by node N_i , equal zero if N_i does not lead any node i.e. non-leader node.
g_i	The undirected graph that represents node i and its immediate neighbors. Vertices of g_i represent N_i and its immediate neighbors, and an edge between two nodes exist only if the two nodes are within the transmission range of each other.
J_i	The adjacency matrix of g_i .
Q_i	The set of all cliques in g_i . $Q_i = \{q_1^i, q_2^i, \dots, q_m^i\}$
$ q_j^i $	The size of clique q_j^i of the graph g_i .
$q_{\max}^i$	The maximum clique of the graph g_i , $q_{\max}^i \in Q_i$
$q_{\max}$	The clique with the maximum size among $q_{\max}^i, i = 1, \dots, n$ where n is the number of graphs in the network, i.e.
$E_K(M)$	Encryption of message M using key K

$D_K(M)$	Decryption of message M encrypted by key K
$Sign_K(M)$	Signature of message M using the key K
$Ver_K(M)$	Verification of message M signed by key K
$\mathbb{Z}_p$	The set of prime integer
$((\bullet))$	Local broadcast or Group broadcast
$((\bullet))$	Global Broadcast
————	Connect two nodes within the transmission range of each other and trust each other
-----	Communication between two nodes out of the transmission range of each other
————	Connect two nodes that trust each other and not necessary within the transmission range of each other.
- - -	Connect two nodes within the transmission range of each other but do not trust each other
	Key establishment using the proposed key exchange algorithm

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECBD	Elliptic Curve Burmester and Desmedt protocol
MRKT	Mixed-Radix Key Transport protocol
GNV	Gong, Needham and Yahalom logic
KDC	Key Distribution Center
CA	Certificate Authority
PGP	Pretty Good Privacy
TTL	Time to Live
NLR	Node Leave Request
NKU	Network Key Update
KEF	Key Establishment Function
KDF	Key Derivation Function
LRR	Leader Replacement Reply
CREP	Certificate Reply
CREQ	Certificate Request
NJR	Node Join Request
WG	Witness Group
RCR	Root Confirmation Request
KEP	Key Establishment Permission
NLEP	Network Leader Election Protocol
NLCP	Network Leader Confirmation Protocol
NKEP	Network Key Establishment Protocol
GKEP	Group Key Establishment Protocol
RNM	Root Nomination Message
RCM	Root Confirmation Message
MITM	Man in the middle attack
NRR	Node Replacement Request
LRR	Leader Replacement Reply
RTM	Network Leader Termination Message
MREQ	Communication Request
MREP	Communication Reply
KREQ	Key Request
KREP	Key Reply
AREQ	Authentication Request
AREP	Authentication Reply

ABSTRACT

A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a kind of wireless ad-hoc networks, which is a self-configuring network of mobile nodes connected by wireless links the union of which forms an arbitrary topology. These nodes have limited power, computation, and communication capabilities; therefore the use of vastly resource consuming security mechanisms is not possible. Secure and efficient key management in MANETs has been a challenging task for the researchers due to the properties of MANETs like dynamic topologies, use of wireless media, no fixed infrastructure, low-energy constraint devices, limited storage and computation resources. In this thesis we propose a secure, efficient, and authenticated key management protocol for a group of communicating devices in MANETs.

Our proposed key management scheme is based on the concept that each group of nodes within the transmission range of each other can start a key establishment process. These groups can agree on a common key using a transitive authentication technique we developed. We also proposed an authentication protocol, Ad-hoc On Demand Authentication Chain Protocol (AOAC), which allow individual node to authenticate each other and to establish a shared key for peer-to-peer communication, the authentication does not rely on any centralize trusted authority or fixed server and is not based on public key cryptography. The proposed scheme supports dynamic membership operation and considers the dynamic behavior of the network topology. We also developed a key exchange algorithm which is used by our proposed key establishment protocol; it uses elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and mixed radix conversion (MRC) to improve performance and save computation and communication cost. Our proposed key exchange algorithm is divided into two algorithms: a key agreement algorithm which is used by our proposed key establishment protocol during the setup phase, and a key transport algorithm which is used by our proposed protocol any time a re-keying is needed e.g. node leave or node join. The proposed scheme support dynamic network operations like join and leave operations.

Our key management scheme can be implemented in any network topology as long as the network is connected, only in the setup phase i.e. there is at least one communication link exists to all parties.

1. Introduction

Ad-hoc is adj. Latin shorthand meaning "for this purpose only" [1]. Thus, an ad hoc committee is formed for a specific purpose, usually appointed to solve a particular problem. A mobile ad-hoc network (MANETs) is a self-configuring network of mobile routers (and associated hosts) connected by wireless links—the union of which form an arbitrary topology. The routers are free to move randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network's wireless topology may change rapidly and unpredictably. Such a network may operate in a standalone fashion, or may be connected to the larger Internet. Minimal configuration and quick deployment make ad-hoc networks suitable for emergency situations like natural or human-induced disasters, military conflicts, emergency medical situations, etc.

The communication security in ad-hoc networks is commonly based on cryptographic techniques which are based on a shared secret key known by the group of nodes that forms the network. The procedure for creating such a common secret for a group of communicating entities is called group key management. For example, when a group of people are in a closed meeting, they may want to form a private wireless network with their laptops in an ad-hoc manner. There may be no secure channel to connect the computers, and the participants may not have any common means to identify and authenticate each other digitally. This means that they originally do not share any secret keys nor have mutually verifiable public key certificate chains or access to a trusted key distribution center. An eavesdropper might listen to and interfere with their communication, even masquerade as one of them. They would need a group key management protocol, but the nature of ad-hoc networks sets certain special requirements for such a protocol. Another example is a mobile military network, which is both security sensitive and easily exposed to security attacks. Not only the information passing in the network is confidential but the wireless traffic itself can reveal the location of a target to the enemy. The nodes, roaming in hostile environment with little physical protection, might be compromised, which increases the possibility of insider attacks.

From the above examples we can consider ad-hoc networks as dynamic, peer-to-peer networks that do not have a pre-existing infrastructure. They are constructed on the spot. The parties involved might not have a common history. They are often