Evaluating zero-determinant strategies’ effects on cooperation and conflict resolution in repeated games

Abstract

This paper discusses the importance of using rationality and freedom to serve oneself and cooperate with others. It highlights the possibility of the prisoner's dilemma as a model for collaboration in a collaborative scenario. It answers the question of how zero-determinant strategies can be used to impose a one-sided linear reward relationship between a player's payoff and his opponent's payoff. Researchers focus on manipulative zero-determinant strategies and their impact on evolutionary gaming outcomes in large populations. In our work, we elicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for an actionable reward relationship in multi-player social dilemmas with a limited number of expected rounds. The study explores the concept of rewarded relationships and their role in achieving desired results. We provide insights into strategies players can use to maximize their gains in these dilemmas. In general, the study emphasizes the importance of using game theory to address complex problems in various fields.