On dynamics of Randomly Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma Game (RAPDG)

Abstract

In this article, our model consists of two players and two choices for each player. In this model, there is one option for one player in each round called leader. The two players have the same chance to be leader. In this model each two consecutive rounds represent one unit. We consider strategies realized by simple transition rules depending on the previous outcome. We consider homogeneous population of strategy Ω, and ask for the most favorable adaptation. Any parameter s in Ω changes according to the adaptivedynamics Ṡ = ∂F(ω,ω′)/∂s where is the payoff for Ω-player against Ω′ player and this evaluated at Ω′ = Ω. © 2013 Essam El-Seidy and Heba K. Arafat.